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Abstract: In an era in which scholars have decried the ways schooling has become increasingly tied
to the measurement of “objective” knowledge through reductive assessments, teaching and learning
have become less humane. This essay theorizes that friendship might provide a way out of this
dehumanizing trajectory for teaching and learning, opening up new, more humane relational
possibilities between teachers and students. Using my own narratives to explore the (im)possibilities
of thinking friendship in teaching, I draw on theorizing from various Continental thinkers (Derrida,
Rancière, & Foucault) in order to make the case that aspects of friendship that are worthwhile—
honesty, compassion, humanity—may never breach the surface of daily student-teacher relation
without occasions of real vulnerability. Such risks are all the more beautiful for the humanizing
possibilities they offer in these increasingly dehumanizing times.
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“O my friends, there is no friend”: Friendship & Risking Relational (Im)possibilities in the
Classroom

Through, perhaps, another experience of the possible.
--Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship
In a recent piece in The Chronicle of Higher Educationi, Rob Jenkins defines his relationship with
his students: “I’m not your boss, your parent, or your BFF. I’m your professor.” His is a sentiment
long echoed by teachers asserting their classroom authority and upholding the singular relationship
of teacher and student over and against other ways of relating. As a teacher myself, I’m not sure how
to square that with, as just one example, this letter from a former student, who did not hesitate to
call me his friend (or mock me) in expressing his appreciation:

I share this note, indulgent as it may be, to point to the very real ways in which students may look at
teachers—whether teachers realize it or not, whether they like it or not—as friends. And while I take
issue with Jenkins that, in varying ways, what professors and teachers do actually is at times bossy,
parental, and friendly, I see his point. Friendship makes things tricky. When it starts to creep into the
ways we teachers see students and the ways they see us, it can undermine our authority and, at worst,
lead to scandal. Nevertheless, friendship may be of especial use in our current moment. In an era in
which scholars across the spectrum of education research have decried ways schooling has become
3

increasingly tied to measurement of “objective” knowledge through reductive assessments (e.g.,
Giroux, 2011; Labaree, 2010), teaching and learning has become less human(e) (Grumet & Pinar,
2014; Paris & Winn, 2013). This essay theorizes that friendship might point to ways out of or around
this dehumanizing trajectory. Friendship stands, in some sense, athwart history, able to do different
things because of a relation that suggests teacher and student might engage with (and learn to like)
the person in front of them, and worry about the testable later, if at all.
We typically understand friendship as “a close and informal relationship of mutual trust and
intimacy” (OED). On a basic level, friends care about each other. They spend time interacting in
ways that are mutually beneficial. Friendships usually take a period of time to develop—we typically
don’t speak of having a friendship with a person without a series of enjoyable experiences with
them; friendships emerge and are maintained by continued mutual experience and affection. The
novelist Elie Wiesel (1995) explains, “friendship is never anything but sharing” (p. 27). Because of
the reciprocal nature of this sharing, we also typically speak of friends as equals. I don’t mean this
absolutely—a friendship certainly does not erase the differences between people—but rather during
the act of communicating as a friend we typically don’t speak from a place of superiority or
inferiority. This makes a friendship a safe(r) space for honesty and vulnerability: as Emerson (1982)
remarked, “it is one of the blessings of old friends that you can afford to be stupid with them.” (p.
195) There’s certainly much more to this normal understanding of what constitutes a friendship (not
to mention the plurality of different ways of enacting friendship in practice) than I could hope to
tackle here. Putting aside that general notion of the term, I focus on the aspects of friendship noted
in the definitions above—care, equality, honesty, and vulnerability—as well as one specific notion:
that friendship, understood as a relation of equality that affords honesty and vulnerability, constitutes a
risk to the teacher-student relationship. Accordingly, the stories I share below should not be
considered exemplars of instances of teacher-student friendship but rather as pointing to the risks
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involved in the teacher-student relationship when aspects I’ve identified with emerge. As with any
risk worth taking, friendship offers teachers something valuable: it harbors the potential for
humanizing the relationship in a time of increasingly dehumanizing reform in schools.
This essay both builds on and moves away from the work of Burke and Greteman (2013),
who offer an “ethics that allows teachers and students to maintain notions of mutual practice and
appreciation borne of liking that asks very little other than respect and friendship.” (p. 168) Their
conceptual framing of teaching contrasts ‘liking’ students with ‘loving’ them, the latter which, given
the particular Christian notions of love they draw upon, may involve teaching in ways that deny
students’ expressed interests for the sake of “what’s good for them”. For my part, I turn to Derrida,
whose The Politics of Friendship (2005) theorizes the concept as a relational mode across history. I also
draw on Rancière’s (1991) conceptualization of educational equality and Foucault’s (2008) notion of
parrhesia to help think about what’s asked of students and teachers in attempting friendship. All this
to demonstrate how we can learn other, different things when we consider the relationships between
students and teachers through a lensing of friendship: the vicissitudes of contemporary schooling,
the complexity of what Foucault (2005) calls “the relational world our institutions have so
considerably impoverished” (p. 95), where (and who) we’ve failed in education, and how we might
better attend to the human beings caught up in schooling. “The necessary consequence of this
strange configuration [friendship in education] is an opportunity for thought” (Derrida, 2005, p. 7).
I begin with a history of the concept of friendship and how it’s been thought across the ages,
drawing on Derrida’s own understanding as well as scholars of his work. I then provide an overview
of scholarship on the concept as it’s been taken up in education specifically. Following that, I begin
to theorize educational friendship in earnest, making use of an anecdotal method of theory-making
(Gallop, 2002) in which I draw on two of my own stories in order to engage various aspects of
friendship in the context of education: (1) Derridean friendship & reciprocity; (2) Rancierian
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equality; (3) Foucauldian parrhesia and the risk of friendship. I conclude with a consideration of the
usefulness of this theorizing of friendship in this moment in schools, suggesting future trajectories in
education and research through, perhaps, another experience of the possible.
A Brief History of Friendship
One problem with studying friendship is: where-to-begin. The relation is undoubtedly
ancient, co-extensive with our earliest days as a species living in community, and has such a vast
history that writing it is incredibly intimidating. Friendship is also something everyone knows
intimately, having friendships of their own. Nevertheless, it’s useful to have context for
understanding how scholars respond to that history; I’ll attempt to provide that briefly here so we
can think with them about friendship before moving into the realm of education specifically.
The intellectual history of friendship, according to Dallmyr (1999) can be understood as the
story of its decline with the concurrent rise of individualism since antiquity. For the Greeks,
friendship was valued as a fundamental relational mode at the heart of civic duty. The concept was
inextricably political, undergirding democracy: “there is no democracy without the community of
friends” (Derrida, 2005, p. 22). Aristotle wrote extensively of the worth of friendship, extolling it as
“the ethical bond holding together a city or public regime” (Dallmyr, 1999, p. 105). (It’s hard to
think this today here in the U.S., where politicians are so often unabashedly partisan and selfinterested, at best serving the narrow interests of their constituents with little obligation to the other
side—we need only look at the revolving door of one-time “friends” of the current President who
found they couldn’t work with his administration). King (1999) notes that “Aristotle claimed to
value friendship more highly than justice, on the assumption that, with the first, there is no need for
the second.” (p. 12). The primary feature of this Greco-Roman model of friendship was reciprocity:
an exchange of mutual benefit for both parties. Friendship and the reciprocity it depended upon
functioned as the foundation of politics in antiquity, providing an understanding of the relationship
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between persons that made politics possible. Framing civic participation as an interaction between
friends oriented the Greeks toward “politicist concord” (Derrida, 1988, p. 632), harmonious
agreement which reciprocated the needs of equals within the polis.
Various social and cultural forces contributed to the declining status of friendship as a
concept of intellectual interest: the growth of Christianity emphasized individuality in the man-God
relationship; Cartesian philosophy, which came to undergird modern Western thought, centered the
rational thinking-self at the expense of the collective; and subsequent liberal theory privileged the
individual’s self-interest as the driving force of political and market economics (Dallmyr, 1999, p.
105). All of which downplayed the relationship between the self and others, making it seem less and
less worthwhile to philosophize on the nature of a relational concept like friendship as opposed to
individual concerns like existentialism, the psychoanalytic ego, identity, etc. We can see this history
manifest in much of how we understand what it means to be a person today: in the individual vote,
the emphasis on career and personal success, the spread of capitalism into contemporary global
neoliberalism, and the decline of our collective institutions (public schools among them). Putnam’s
(2001) seminal study of contemporary relationships in the U.S., Bowling Alone, finds that the social
history of what it meant to grow up in the U.S. in the 20th century followed a similar trajectory,
tracing the vibrant relational life of youth to the narrowing of relations in adulthood. As we go on,
the thinking goes, we find less time for friendships in the midst of the important work of being our
own person.
The purpose of providing this history is not to suggest a “one-dimensional story of social
decline…grossly truncat[ing] the intricate complexity of the process” (Dallmyr, 1999, p. 106),
though King (1999) argues it is a “defensible thesis that no major book on friendship has appeared
since Cicero, 2000 years ago” (p. 12). Rather, I provide this narrative of decline in order to show
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how a number of Continental thinkers saw in it an intellectual opening, “plac[ing] friendship…in a
novel way on the intellectual agenda” (Dallmyr, 1999, p. 106).
Friendship & Teaching
An emphasis on the individual came to suffuse predominant approaches to teaching and
learning as well. Thayer-Bacon (2004) argues “schools in America currently focus predominately on
the outcomes and products of schooling. Often these are entirely disconnected from …relational
processes” (p. 168). A longstanding strain of curricular research disregards educational relations
entirely, positioning students as separate individuals to be educated (e.g., Callahan, 1964; Tyler,
1969). When the subject of teacher-student relations is addressed, it’s often done in keeping with the
common sentiment expressed by Jenkins above, familiar to many preservice teachers and teacher
educators: “teachers should not be friends with their students.” This is backed by a raft of research
on the importance of cultivating careful professional teacher-student relationships, particularly for
high school students (e.g., Dika & Singh, 2002; Hughes et al., 1999; Midgley et al., 1989).
But through Derrida’s (1998) lens, friendship may be inevitable in any human relation,
educational or otherwise, as a precondition for communication with another. This precondition
consists of “the always already given presuppositions of being and discourse…which must be
supposed so as to let oneself be understood” (pp. 635-636), what Derrida terms ‘minimal friendship’
or ‘preliminary consent’ or ‘friendship prior to friendships’ or an “anterior affirmation of beingtogether”1ii (p. 636). Put differently, communicating with another requires a willingness to listen to
them, and assumes they are worth listening to—this arrangement can be understood then as
constituting a kind of friendship, as one person recognizing the good in communicating with
another.
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In addition, previous scholarship has asserted that friendship between teachers and students
may not only be possible and already present, but desirable. Noddings (2005), for example, moves
the conversation around educational relations to the possibilities of friendship. As she explains, the
nature of friendship is that “friends wish the best to their friends for the friends’ sake. A friend does
not seek something for himself in wishing the best for his friend.” (p. 102) For Noddings:
Friends point each other upward, and that is why friendship is so important to moral life. They
do not stand by silently while their friends do things they believe are wrong…they have our best
interests in mind. It is in this sense, perhaps, that Aristotle once said that whatever teaching
does, it does as to a friend; that is, the teacher wants the best for her student for the student’s own
sake. (p. 102)
Friendship in Noddings’ framing is valuable as an ethical relation undergirding her normative
philosophy for how a person should relate to another. Ditto: teachers and students. In orienting
themselves towards students as friends, teachers have the potential to enrich students’ moral lives,
carrying on the Aristotelian tradition of friendship as the foundational principle undergirding the
formation of persons in political, communal, and social spheres.
Still, Noddings is in the minority with respect to friendship between students and teachers,
and we would do well to consider just why that is. Beyond professional concerns with the individual
undergirding Tyler’s (1969) rationale for forsaking the relational, the specter of teacher-student sex
also looms over the relationship. A bevy of high-profile scandals testify to the fascination of the
media and public (at least in the U.S.) with any whiff of such erotic relations, so much so that the
long-standing sketch comedy show Saturday Night Live has a recurring series of skits on the subject
called “Teacher Trial”. Given the sensational tone of many of these stories and the SNL gag, it can
seem easy to dismiss this as just another example of the sexual paranoia of a typically puritanical
American public. And yet, with recent revelations of workplace sexual abuse brought to life by the
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#MeToo movement, there seems good reason to be concerned about the possibilities of those in
authority—corporate bosses, film directors, classroom teachers—to abuse a professional
relationship. My own institution, for example, is currently fraught with the fallout from the
systematic sexual abuse of hundreds of student-athletes by gymnastics team-doctor Larry Nasser.
This is all a monstrously troubling story, and something I do not intend to take lightly here. Given
more time, it would be worth building upon and complicating research that has long established the
erotic (e.g., Garrison, 1994; McWilliam, 1999) nature of teaching, as an act of seduction, in order to
consider the implications of the contemporary crisis in light of those theories. But to be clear, I am
not interested in considering literal erotic relations between teachers and students in this essay.
Rather, following Burke & Greteman (2013) via Foucault (1988), I take up friendship in teaching
precisely to move around/beyond the sexual to see what kinds of relations are made possible.
Anecdotal Theory
More often than not, we know and remember our friends—we understand ourselves as
having a friendship—through stories we tell others and ourselves about them. We recount trips taken,
crises weathered, parties thrown and problems solved through narratives that constitute the stuff of
friendship. When I give a toast at my best friend’s wedding in two months, I’ll tell a story about the
time he visited me in Michigan and made a fool of himself in front of my colleagues, much (I’m
sure) to the embarrassment of his wife and her family and to the great joy of my friends and myself.
Theorizing with stories, then, was a natural fit for this essay. I knew that I wanted to make use of
narratives because I have long been seduced by Hendry’s (2015) claim that “if inquiry (research) is
understood as meaning making, then all inquiry is narrative” (p. 72). Part of the draw to stories is
undoubtedly also due to my own history with the form; as a former English major and teacher, I’ve
come to know things and people in and through stories and I feel comfortable working with them.
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The stories I did end up writing are brief; you might even, perhaps derisively, say they’re
anecdotal. The approach I settled on takes up Jane Gallop’s (2002) “anecdotal theory”, in which she
provides “short accounts of some interesting or humorous incident” (p. 2) and attempts to read
them for the theoretical insights they afford. Importantly, “the anecdotes become ‘interesting’
precisely for their ability to intervene in contemporary theoretical debates.” (p. 2) Here I’m
interested in reading my own anecdotal recountings for their potential to intervene in contemporary
understandings of teacher-student relationships, exploring in what ways aspects of friendship may or
may not come to light in these stories. We might understand these anecdotes as ‘exorbitant
moments’ that, “however literary, [are] nevertheless directly pointed towards or rooted in the real”
(Fineman, 1991, as cited in Gallop, p. 3). This work assumes that the moment is central to theorizing
“in a way that resists the norm” (p. 6). Importantly, I myself worry, along with critics, that such selfwork might devolve into narcissism, nostalgia and self-indulgence. Hartman (2008) helps here:
the autobiographical example is not a personal story that folds onto itself; it’s not about
navel gazing, it’s…about trying to look at historical and social process and one’s own
formation as a window onto social and historical processes. (p. 7)
It’s my hope that these stories may be “capable of engaging and countering the violence of
abstraction” (p. 7) by rendering notions of teacher-student relations and friendship as narrative for
the building of novel and necessary theory.
Theorizing with Derrida & Friends
In what follows I theorize with a little help from my friends: poststructural thinkers who
have taken up notions of friendship and related conceptual frames. I gather them all in one room,
living and dead, across space and time, putting them into friendly conversationiii with two of my own
anecdotal stories in order to consider what may and may not be possible to think with respect to
friendship in education.
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Derridean Friendship & Reciprocity
As noted above, the foundation for the Greco-Roman model of friendship was reciprocity:
friendship constituted an exchange for the mutual benefit of both persons. Two friends each
contribute to their common good, as in a conversation in which both learn from each other. Derrida
(2005) understands modern friendship similarly:
The test of friendship remains…[that]…the friend must not only be good in himself, in a
simple or absolute manner, he must be good for you, in relation to you who are his friend.
(p. 21)
And yet, Derrida would not be Derrida if he didn’t rupture traditional Western thought. With
respect to friendship, reciprocity is where he chooses to make that rupture. Derrida isn’t particularly
sanguine about the continuity of reciprocal friendship in the contemporary world because of the
rupture of language ushered in by his work of deconstruction. The problem of the instability of
language, which prompted the linguistic turn in philosophy, literary criticism and theory, engages the
notion that “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 2016, p. 158), and thus that we must work
with/in language despite its fundamental shortcomings.
If we assume that the basis of all friendship, the foundation that Derrida calls ‘minimal
friendship’, lies in communication with and through language, then this rupture presents a crisis to
friendship-as-reciprocity. Without “the reliability of the stable” (Derrida, 2005, p. 22) understanding
of language, how can we understand friendship as a reciprocal exchange of language? What is left of
friendship without that foundation? And what can we talk about with respect to a relationship given
that nothing is outside text—ourselves, our friends, and our friendships included? The point, here, is
not to be pessimistic about friendship, nor to suggest that friends aren’t or shouldn’t be reciprocal.
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Rather, what I want to point to, with a story of my own, is a problem at the heart of reciprocal
friendship, of the type that Derrida deconstructs, that I see at work in the teacher-student
relationship. Again I remind that my focus in the following story will be on the risk that aspects of
friendship (honesty, vulnerability, equality) pose to the relationship between teacher and student.
*

*

*

Off Campus
I returned to Indiana frustrated after a year teaching 11th grade American Lit. at a Catholic School in
Brownsville, TX. That summer, my second full of M.Ed. coursework as part of my alternative certification program,
had me taking courses in Differentiated Instruction, Assessment, and Secondary English methods, none of which
seemed particularly helpful to me in the chaos of keeping my head above water as a beginning teacher. The methods
course, at least, wasn’t as stifling—not practical in ways that seemed helpful to me then, but more literary than the
very measured and scientific vision of teaching pushed by my other courses. And I trusted the professor, Kevin, who
seemed more sympathetic to the confusions of classrooms than other professors who seemed untroubled, who had it
figured out.
So I met Kevin for a beer at one of the faux-Irish chain-pubs just off campus. This was a new experience for
me—I had never drunk with a professor, or indeed, at 22, any professional person. We discussed my problems with
teaching, with Brownsville, with feeling isolated from college friends working at banks in Manhattan or attending
medical schools in Chicago. Kevin listened—there was nothing pedagogical going on, as far as I could tell. Rather than
offering some professorly advice (“Hang in there” or “Everyone struggles during their first year” or “Have you read
[some provincial academic you couldn’t give a shit about]?”), Kevin told me about his own problems—how deeply
unhappy he was working at a program he felt didn’t support him as an intellectual, academic, and researcher, a
program increasingly aligned with a brand of Right-wing politics which he saw himself as dedicated to working against.
He told me he was on the market for a new position.
*

*

*
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I wrote this story with friendship in mind. Importantly, I think “Off Campus” hinges—the
point at which the thing pivots from a teacher-student anecdote into something I think of as
friendship—on reciprocity. “Rather than offering some professorly advice…”, I wrote, “Kevin told
me about his own problems.” There’s the exchange: the swapping of our mutual professional
anxieties and dissatisfications with a program philosophically and politically ill-suited to us. What’s
more, I think I understood this as friendship because of the honesty I perceived in what Kevin told
me. In sharing with me his dissatisfaction with the program we were both a part of, he rendered
himself vulnerable, perhaps, to the information getting out and back to his supervisors. That risk
gave the impression that I was talking to him not as a teacher but as a friend. There appears to be a
tacit calculation: the vulnerability exposed by sharing honestly with me against the value of that
commiseration to me as a friend. The latter compassion won out, it seems, suggesting that the
primary concern here was for my sake—pedagogical friendship in the Noddings sense, then.
But this story also points, I think, to the impossibilities of reconciling friendship with
teaching. It’s a story about Kevin’s desire to leave his position at the institution we were both a part
of, the institution that positioned him as my teacher. It was only in sharing with me his desire to
vacate his position that I felt the presence of friendship. This contradiction is not lost on Derrida—
it’s at the heart of what he understands is going on with modern friendship, one beyond reciprocity.
As he understands it, friendship is largely one-sided: “Friendship, what is that? It is to love before
being lovediv” (Derrida, 2005, p. 9). After taking the poststructural turn, we can no longer think of
love or friendship as an essence or a form in itself but rather as performed: “One loves only by
declaring that one loves” (p. 9). Friends are friends because they are named as such with language,
another ordering of things (Foucault, 1994)—and with the deconstruction of language ushered in by
Derrida and others, friendship, as a reciprocal act of naming in which meaning is carried across
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language, may not be possible. Tracing this rupture in language through Nietzsche and Blanchot’s
thought, Derrida (1988) considers how those writers:
call the friend by a name that is no longer that of a neighbor, perhaps no longer that of a
man…the ‘who’ of friendship now moves off into the distance beyond all these determinations;
in its infinite immanence, it exceeds the interest of knowledge, science, truth, proximity, even life
and even the memory of life. (p. 632)
Broadly, Derrida’s thought is marked by the privileging of radical difference and singularity—making
it difficult if not impossible to think friendship reciprocally, insofar as that necessarily depends on
the un-dependability of language. In the story above, we can read this most immediately in my use of
my teacher’s name: linguistically, I mark him as ‘Kevin’, and not my professor, or with the
salutations ‘Dr.’ or ‘Mr.’, or something else that would indicate that our relationship in the context
of that conversation was primarily a professional one. The use of the first name de-formalizes,
making the discourse look and sound like a conversation that might occur between friends—and
conspicuously not that between a teacher or figure of authority and a student or subordinatev.
Moving away from reciprocity entirely, Derrida (2005) understands friendship as not even
necessarily desiring reciprocal exchange: “If a friend had to choose between knowing and being
known, he would choose knowing rather than being known” (p. 11). Thus we’re left now in a
strange and contradictory place—what would it mean to be friends without friendship?
This is where the cryptic, probably apocryphal quote Derrida attributes to Aristotle (via
Montaigne) comes in, which I take for my title: “O my friends, there is no friend” (p. 1). While I
find myself thinking at length in this paper that friendship might be useful, it nevertheless may also
be true, following Derrida, that my students and teachers are not my friends. Put differently, in
calling them my friends I’m no longer calling them students or teachers. This isn’t just about
semantics—I read it as a negation with language of their respective educational positions. That is,
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through a Derridean lens, only by declaring them friends do they become friends; and swimming as
we all are in the Jenkinsian discourse that a teacher-student relationship is not a friendship, calling
my student a friend negates their discursive status as my student. I’m now speaking to someone in a
different position, in a different register, and there’s a marked shift in what is and is not possible to
say. It may be then that pedagogical friendship is only a “recognition of the common strangeness
that does not allow us to speak of our friends but only to them” (Derrida, 1988, p. 643).
Hopefully, Derrida leaves room for the future possibility of friendship:
Friendship is never given in the present. It belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise, or
of commitment…that which responsibility opens to the future” (pp. 635-636)
(I am indeed good friends with Kevin and with many former teachers and students). Friendship,
then, offers us “fucking human beingsvi” (Wallace, as cited in McCaffery, 1993, p. 4) a trajectory out
of the dehumanizing work of the contemporary, particularly neoliberal educational moment, wherein
standardization and accountability reforms, rampant testing, scripted curricula, etc. all problematize
the complex, messy, human interactions between teachers and students. Recent pushes for the
pedagogical use of digital technology (like MOOC’s, which promise to “revolutionize” schools)
seem literally bent on reducing and removing the human, relational components of the educational
system, by, for example, upping the teacher-student ratio into the tens of thousandsvii. All of which
pushes us toward a pedagogical model more predictable than one that depends on the mysteries of
persons—and of course as in any neoliberal reform effort, a cheaper one. I mean “way out” quite
literally, as this story demonstrates: in these times of profound disconnection (Mayo, 2017, p. 365),
friendship may only be possible outside of the profession entirely.
Rancièrian Equality
In The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991), Rancière sets out to demonstrate that a teacher has
“nothing to teach” (p. 15), envisioning a pedagogy which assumes equality as a starting point for the
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work of teaching rather than a goal to be achieved with students at the end of their education. An
ignorant schoolmaster is one who does not presume to have knowledge or a curriculum to present
students—who are themselves as much capable of deciding what counts as knowledge and the
curriculum as the schoolmaster is. Rather, what the ignorant schoolmaster teaches students, if
anything, are the ways students and teachers are educational equals and, importantly, what is made
possible if they understand education as beginning from a place of equality. In this way, the ignorant
schoolmaster “emancipates” rather than “teaches” students in the conventional sense: “he will not
verify what the student has found; he will verify that the student has searched. He will judge whether
or not he has paid attention” (p. 31).
Oriented this way, how can we think about the teacher-student relationship? Rancière’s
approach is undeniably relational: as an initial example, he points to the 1833 tailors’ strike in Paris
and their demand for “relations of equality” with their masters (pp. 47-48). Such relations
“repudiat[e] the division between those who know and those who don’t, between those who possess
or don’t possess the property of intelligence. (p. 71) Thus for educational relations to be equal, they
have to reject the conventional teacher-student hierarchy, in which the expert teacher transmits
knowledge via curriculum to students, a type of unequal relation Freire (2000) terms “the banking
model.” Instead of the inequality of hierarchical relations, the Rancièrian (1991) model seeks as its
end a community that “would know only minds in action: people who do, who speak about what
they are doing, and who thus transform all their works into ways of demonstrating the humanity that
is in them as in everyone” (p. 71). Establishing and upholding relations of equality is about
humanizing the persons in the midst of the educational enterprise, work on its way towards
establishing a society of equals. But importantly, Rancière explains that in pursuit of such a society:

17

it is true that we don’t know that men are equal. We are saying that they might be. This is our
opinion, and we are trying, along with those who think as we do, to verify it. But we know
this might is the very thing that makes a society of humans possible. (p. 73)
In other words, in assuming equality as a starting point for thinking education and relations between
students and teachers, Rancierian equality becomes a project of imagination, of exploring possibility
as a way towards more human(e) classrooms.
Pedagogical relations of equality might be thought of as a form of friendship. We do not
presume to know more about our friends than they themselves do; we are in that very particular
Rancièrian sense “ignorant.” We may offer friendly advice, but we do so usually from a relatively
humble position of equality, in keeping with Noddings’ understanding that friends do what’s best for
their friends’ sake while also respecting each other’s autonomy. On this point, Derrida (2005) agrees:
“friendship demands an equality of virtue between friends” (p. 23). Indeed, in demonstrating what it
takes to be an ignorant schoolmaster—namely, to ask students what they know, in order to begin
their search for knowledge—Rancière (1991) invokes friendship as a different way of talking to a
child: “to verify the young student’s knowledge, you need not hesitate to perform this inquiry, even
though you have had no schooling. “‘What are you learning, my little friend?’ you will ask the child.”
(p. 33) It seems friendship, dependent on an equality of the relation, is well-suited as a relational
mode for building those relations pedagogically.
We can overlay this framework relatively easily onto the story above to see ways my
relationship with Kevin evidences aspects of Rancièrian equality. As noted above, my use of his first
name acts as a linguistic marker of equality, recalling the way friends address each other. But my
characterization of Kevin also demonstrates a pedagogical ignorance of the type Rancière
understands as foundational to educational equality. I note I “trusted” Kevin because he “seemed
more sympathetic to the confusions of classrooms than my other professors…who had it all figured
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out.”—he expressed what Rancière would understand as an ignorant stance in his capacity as my
teacher. Later, the story pivots on his “refusal to offer professorly advice” and my observation that
“there was nothing pedagogical going on.” I felt that there was nothing for Kevin to teach me, and
that nothing was being taught in that moment. Instead, we drank and shared our frustrations,
commiserating as friends often do but not, as I make clear I felt in the story, as teachers and
students do. We sat together as frustrated equals.
One way to think about why the moment felt like a friendship among equals has to do with
that absence of pedagogy: I didn’t feel like my concerns were being instrumentalized towards
whatever Kevin, as my professor, felt he should teach me; I was a person with an equal right to
believe what I wanted to. As Derrida (2005) notes, friendships, like Rancièrian equality are noninstrumental: “Why are the mean, the malevolent, the ill-intentioned not, by definition, good
friends? Because they prefer things to friends.” (p. 19). That is, in this story I do not understand
myself positioned as a student, a thing to be taught, but instead as a friend. Yet my reading here
suggests that, if the non-instrumental equality of friendship has to do with the absence of pedagogy,
then pedagogy may be inherently instrumental, always already an imposition on students, and thus
teacher-student friendship of the non-instrumental, non-impositional kind (which is to say, a
friendship among equals) may be impossible. Indeed, I agree with Segall (2002) that:
Even good and democratic teachers…impose their views. Such an imposition is inevitable;
it derives from the very act of teaching, of making choices among a variety of possible
learning opportunities for one’s students; choices that advance some knowledge, knowing,
and knowers over others. (p. 98)
I’m skeptical then that something like friendship could happen between students and teachers given
this understanding of teaching—even the most well-intentioned, equality-focused teaching—as
always an unequal imposition. As a teacher-educator, for example, I attempt to counter this unequal
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relation by espousing student-centered approaches to teaching that primatize students’ own
meaning-making capabilities in their learning. This is nevertheless an imposition of my own view:
that student-centered teaching often makes for more meaningful and ethical learning than the
alternatives. This is also, it should be noted, its own form of relational inequality, in that it privileges
the student over the teacher. Any teacher who has attempted this type of pedagogy has likely
encountered student resistance to it; it’s always curious how students often respond to “liberatory”
student-centered lessons with protests that they’re “not actually being taught anything,” expressing
the desire to go back to a mode where the teacher lectures, they as students take notes, and they’re
tested at the end of it all. Which is to say they want their education to resemble “school” as they’ve
experienced it in their pasts, by and large, and have to come to understand how it has been and
should be. This view need not necessarily be incompatible with Rancière, though, whose pedagogy
doesn’t focus on achieving equality through imposition but rather assumes equality as a starting
point. The latter may make friendship, which in my view requires an assumption of equality,
possible, but I don’t think I would call it teaching: indeed, “Off Campus” is a story about
establishing a friendship with a teacher who is no longer my teacher.
Foucault & the Beautiful Risk of Friendship
In addition to a move towards equality, pedagogical friendship also entails risk—in “Off
Campus”, Kevin shared information with me that may have put his job as my teacher in jeopardy.
Regardless of how serious the risk was, I read it at the time as a real one—and in risking that, I felt
honesty, I felt that I was talking with a friend. In this final section I turn to Foucault, whose
theorizing helps us frame the (im)possibilities of educational friendship through the lens of risk.
Derrida (2000), too, understands friendship as a risk, as requiring a test it might fail: “There is no
friend without time—that is, without that which puts confidence to the test. (p. 15) Foucault himself
was interested in the risk of what he calls “fearless speech”, or parrhesia. For Foucault (2008),
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parrhesia “consists in telling the truth without concealment, reserve, empty manner of speech, or
rhetorical ornament which might encode or hide it” (p. 10). But, crucially, “for there to be
parrhesia…the subject must be taking some kind of risk in speaking” (p. 11). That is, the truth of a
statement is dependent on what’s risked in telling in it. Thus we might understand parrhesia as a
form of virtue, as “involv[ing] some form of courage…which consists in the parrhesiast taking the
risk” (p. 11) As one recent example, I think we can see parrhesia in the Never-Trump movement
(e.g., Stephens, 2017) among republicans who refused to accept the nomination of Donald Trump as
the G.O.P. candidate in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, despite the clear political risks of doing
soviii. Or, in the literary realm, the protagonist of Arthur Miller’s play The Crucible, John Proctor, plays
the part of the parrhesiast when he renounces his false confession, condemning himself to death for
telling the truth. The point is that across these examples truth depends on the extent to which its
telling constitutes a risk to the teller. In what follows, I share a narrative of a moment in my
relationship with one of my former students which helps us see how the risk of parrhesia is tied
inextricably to opening up the possibility of aspects of friendship—what, building on Biesta (2013), I
call “the beautiful risk of friendship”.
*

*

*

The Closed Door
“Take risks,” I tell them. “The point of this speech is to inspire.” Towards the end of my semester teaching
Speech & Multimedia to 9th graders at a Catholic high school in Chicago, I told students to give a speech that would
inspire their peers. They’d already entertained, informed, and persuaded; now the course culminated in a very different
kind of speech: personal in ways the others hadn’t been, creative, risky, requiring vulnerability.
But, being a teacher, I had to cover my ass. I asked students to email me their ideas so I could give them a
once-over: no drugs, no drinking, I hoped. No politics.
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That night I received an email from one of my quieter students, Gabrielleix. Gabby wanted to give a speech
about coming out in 8th grade, about the bullying she’d endured at the hands of Catholic school peers who felt
theologically and culturally sanctioned by the community to treat homosexuality with mockery and contempt. Gabby
wanted to give this speech at her new Catholic high school, in the fall of her first semester. I worried. I asked to meet
with her the following day.
We arranged to meet in the annex of the English office, where English teachers usually took their lunches.
Though it shared a wall with the teachers’ offices (14 desks), it was a private space I felt appropriate given the sensitive
nature of the conversation—Gabby wasn’t openly “out” yet in that school community. We met for ten minutes, during
which time I shared my worries. I told her I admired her courage and that I’m sure it would be inspiring, but I also
wanted she thought through how this might be received by her peers, lest she be bullied again. I told her I couldn’t tell
what to, but I wanted to make sure she’d thought it through. She had.
The next day she gave the speech—it was fantastic. She inspired; her peers cried; I was moved by the
compassion showed by everyone. Couldn’t have gone better.
Later that afternoon, I sat at my desk in the English office. A tap on my shoulder. Our department chair,
Samantha: “Did you meet with a female student in the annex yesterday? With the door closed?”
I knew immediately what she was asking about. Flustered, embarrassed, I explained what the conversation
was about and why I had held the meeting in the annex. I had been told many times, as a young high school teacher,
not to meet behind closed doors with any student. I had forgotten, preoccupied with concern for Gabby and the private
nature of the conversation. Samantha understood: “It’s not a big deal.”
I turned back to my desk and resumed work, futilely. I remembered, then, that my conversation in the annex
with Gabby had been interrupted by another English colleague who had come in to get her lunch.
*

*

*

Risk can be read across “The Closed Door.” When I expressed that I hoped students’
speeches would include “no drugs, no drinking…no politics,” I revealed feelings of vulnerability,
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that in encouraging students to take risks in their speeches, I became aware that teaching in this way
is “a weak, open, and risky process ... only made possible by taking the radical openness and
unpredictability of all communication seriously” (Biesta, 2013, p. 41). If a student spoken about
drugs, drinking, or politics, I felt it would’ve rendered me vulnerable because those subjects are
often deemed taboo in the context of a high school class. I worried, of course, about my job (what if
someone found out? A parent complained?). This was a risk, sure, but looking back now it doesn’t
seem much of one.
Rather, I’m interested in my choice to talk to Gabrielle privately. I did so out of concern for
her sake, as a friend perhaps, that she not be outed in a potentially hostile environment. But this
choice led directly to the conversation with Samantha at the end, which, while not disciplinary, was
fraught, I felt, with the insinuation of something sinister—the specter of a teacher-student sex
scandal, of a male teacher alone with a female student behind a closed door. All the more unnerving
for me was the revelation that a colleague had interrupted my conversation with Gabrielle and went
directly to my department chair to report what she’d seen. It was only after talking with Samantha
that I realized the risk I’d taken (“embarrassed, flustered”), which makes me not such an exemplary
parrhesiast, who must know the risk ahead of time and take it anyway. Still, the story points to the
way my attempt at counseling Gabrielle as a human being, treating her as my friend, was read
scandalously and rendered suspect as a result.
In his analysis of parrhesia, Foucault draws from Plutarch’s (2008) treatise on flattery and
friendship, “which is entirely taken up with…the two opposed, conflicting practices of flattery, on
the one hand, and parrhesia…on the other.” (p. 7)—that is, Foucault equates parrhesia with acting
as a friend. Later, he notes that parrhesia “can only exist if there is friendship” (p. 11) “The Closed
Door” evidences the ways in which truth-telling in a pedagogical relationship—of the kind of a
friend offering honest advice out of concern for their friend’s sake—constituted a risk for me as a
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teacher. In taking this risk, I opened myself up to accusations of impropriety, but I may have
provided the kind of friendly advice Gabrielle needed to go through with the speech. I feel I’m
treading in dangerous water here, downplaying the importance of allegations in this time when so
many men stand accused of sexual misconduct and brush it off as “mere allegation.” That’s not
something I want to do. The challenge of this is trying to take the risk of friendship seriously for
what it offers while also keeping in mind that there are real dangers: not just to teachers who might
lose their jobs but also to students who could become victims. That danger and the fear of it is real
and may be justified, but I still think friendship offers a different way to think about what’s possible
between students and teachers in ways that might humanize rather than harm.
Tentatively, I suggest that friendship as theorized here may not be possible without risk; in
the same way that fearless speech isn’t possible without a real sense of fear—we can’t know whether
or not that speech was fearless unless there is a risk involved. For Foucault, true speech can only
ever be fearless; that is, it can only ever be said (and heard) within a context that makes its telling
risky, that threatens the teller. Similarly, I argue that aspects of friendship that may be worthwhile—
honesty, compassion, humanity—may never breach the surface of daily student-teacher relations
without an occasion of real vulnerability. That is, conditions that render students and teachers
vulnerable, that introduce risks, may be necessary for the emergence of teacher-student friendship—
risks all the more beautiful for the humanizing possibilities they offer in these increasingly
dehumanizing times.
For Biesta (2013): “Education always involves a risk…the risk is there because, as W.B.
Yeats puts it, education is not about filling a bucket but about lighting a fire…not an interaction
between robots but an encounter between human beings” (p. 1). Yet risk is a problem for much of
contemporary education research and policy, which seeks best-practices and some certainty about
“what works” and what doesn’t in classrooms. The fear of risk too pervades much corporate
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education reform, which is necessarily risk-averse, with its neoliberal logic, as markets are. But this
is, as Biesta argues and I hope this paper suggests, a mistake. The mistake is seeing the weakness of
education—its risk, “the fact that there will never be a perfect match between ‘input’ and ‘output’—
only as a defect…and not also as the very condition that makes education possible” (p. 4). Risk
provides the possibility for education as a practice of freedom. “Without the risk, education itself
disappears and social reproduction, insertion into existing ways of being, doing, and thinking, takes
over.” (p. 140) This is what Biesta understands as “the beautiful risk of education”, and this is what I
read as the potential of friendship in both stories—moments of rupture of and against social
reproduction into existing ways of being student and teacher.
Conclusions, Possibilities: A Faith that Opens the Experience of Time
One way to draw these strings together in closing is to say that enacting friendship in
education is difficult, if not impossible: what these stories have evidenced, in light of the theory I’ve
drawn upon, is that pursuing a more humane teacher-student relationship also constitutes significant
risks to all involved. Understandably, teachers may not be willing to take these risks, which hold the
potential for very real professional and personal repercussions. Yet I persist in believing, a faith
without faith, a faith that opens the experience of time (Derrida, 2005, p. 15), that:
If one names and cites the best friends, those who illustrated true and perfect friendship, it is
because this friend comes to illuminate. It illustrates itself, makes happy or successful things
shine, gives them visibility, renders them more resplendent. (p. 3)
Perhaps we can end, then, by thinking about what else we might mean by “friends” that might
illuminate the teacher-student relationship, rendering education more resplendent. Whatever this
other concept is, my hope is that it can enrich the relational work of teaching.
Maybe not friends then. Perhaps an emergency contact in the absence of poetry, as my
former student Sofia suggests:
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Who acknowledges the absences at the heart of contemporary education, absences which only
heighten the longing for richer relationships in schools and beyond them. “In the absence of
sparrows”, writes the poet Daniel Johnson, “a crowd of friends and family gather.” It might be that
thinking about friendship makes it possible to ask and answer the question, in renewed ways, “Can
education create new ways of doing things that balance educational considerations with ethical ones?
(Burke & Greteman, 2013, p. 165). Teachers doing such relational work will need to risk accusations
of impropriety, of insufficient rigor, of unwarranted risk, of impossibility. They’ll need to risk
entering into sincere communication with the human beings that are their students. In what follows
I detail implications of these findings for teaching, teacher education, and research.
Teaching
This essay evidences the importance of attending to the complicated relationships between
teachers and their students. What I believe I’ve contributed differently to that work is the specific
intervention friendship offers to the relationship between teachers and students: a beautiful risk. My
exploration into friendship reveals in particular the value of what’s possible through risking the
relational norm, the agreed-upon relationship between teachers and students: it offers through the
honesty of parrhesia (Foucault, 2008) momentary possibilities (Derrida, 2005) for a more human(e)
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education, one approaching relations of equality (Rancière, 1991). But, at the same time, this essay
points to how such friendship may nevertheless not be realistically possible for teachers who want to
keep their jobs, rendered vulnerable by an entrenched discourse for how they should relate with
students. I never said there wouldn’t be a risk. Still, there is clearly a much-needed space for renewed
consideration of the potentiality of educational relationships—and friendship may just help in this
regard—in light of these dehumanizing times, which seem so bent on making teaching and learning
a mechanistic, predictable, profoundly un-relational and inhuman(e) enterprise.
Teacher Education
Certainly this relational work needs to occur in schools, but I think it might also be fruitfully
developed in the teacher education classroom. What’s especially useful about that space is that it
asks preservice-teachers to span both positions of the pedagogical relationship: they are students in
their teacher-preparation courses, but they also try on the mantles of teacher for the first time in
student-teaching roles and microteaching lessons. They are consequently well-positioned to
experiment with the relationship between those two positions, I think, considering it otherwise, as
they already understand each role as a relatively fluid position they can move in and out of as
needed. Perhaps we might think of friendship that way: not as something to be asserted firmly, what
Biesta (2013) calls a “strong” approach to education, but something taken up as needed, depending
on the lesson, the day, or the particular human beings we encounter. Such relational flexibility would
be crucially useful to pre-service teachers as they begin to negotiate the “possible lives” (Rose, 1999)
they might live in the profession.
Research
We might also consider friendship as a way of framing the researcher-subject relationship.
As any researcher knows, friendships emerge during the course of conducting a study, as
“relationships with people are created, as conversations among those people are exchanged, and as
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interactions rooted in difference, conflict, vulnerabilities, and respect are forged.” (Paris & Winn,
2014, p. 28). Yet such friendships might present problems as researchers come to make decisions
about what to write, who to credit, and how to represent those studied. As Paris and Winn (2014)
make abundantly clear, the choices researchers make can have violently dehumanizing consequences
if they aren’t made in conjunction with those studied in ways that benefit all involved. Friendship
seems an invaluable frame, then, for how we might think the researcher-subject relationship
differently in ways that foreground that relationship to the mutual benefit of both parties. What I’ve
offered here can be understood as a part of the urgent and complicated work of how to humanize
the work of inquiry and the people caught up in it.
By way of closing, I turn to Naomi Shihab Nye’s (1987) poem “Rain”, which centers around
the relational aspects of pedagogy. A student shares the one thing he remembers from 3rd grade—
that someone “tutched” him on the shoulder—and how it came to matter immensely and
improbably in his life. His teacher doesn’t see the value of this, and instead judges her work a failure
because of the trivial nature of his response and mistakes in his spelling. And yet what the student
wrote contains an imagined refuge for him, a world he wants to “go inside and live” though he can’t;
one he can nevertheless imagine as a result of the relational act. What I’ve tried to do here is imagine
a relational world worth inhabiting for students and teachers, one built on the honesty and
compassion and resplendence of the best friendships, even as the stories I’ve told suggest the risks
and impossibilities of realizing those friendships in schools.
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ii
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Defining-the-Relationship/237388
ii ii

Hey, these are his words, not mine. But I think they’re promising, if enigmatic, for what they open up in thinking
friendship in education—so bear with it, if you will.
iii
Cicero: “Friends are together when they are separated, they are rich when they are poor, strong when they are weak,
and – a thing even harder to explain – they live on after they have died.” (1971, p. 56, as cited in Derrida, 2005, p. 5)
iv
I jump between friendship and love here in a manner that might seem confusing, especially if you’re familiar with
Burke & Greteman’s (2013) recovery of liking in pedagogical friendship as a way of resisting problematic discourses
around love in education. Nevertheless, I use ‘love’ here in conjunction with friendship because Derrida does it (though
his usage is still quite confusing—this is an unfortunate side effect of reading Derrida). For the sake of our collective
understanding, think of ‘to love’ here as the verb form of friendship—to treat a person as a friend.
v
This all may seem an awful lot to put on names, but I’m of the mind that they matter a great deal, in that “there’s
something to be said about the power of naming in the creation of reality.” (Burke & DeLeon, 2015, p. 18). And at any
rate, it is Derrida’s own focus on names that led my reading here.
vi
I note here Wallace’s question:
What’s engaging and artistically real is, taking it as axiomatic that the present is grotesquely materialistic, how is
it that we as human beings still have the capacity for joy, charity, genuine connections, for stuff that doesn’t
have a price? And can these capacities thrive? And if so, how, and if not why not? (McCaffery, 1993, p. 4)
He’s of course speaking about creative writing, but I think the aims are nonetheless the same—what happens to the
persons and the relationships between persons caught up in contemporary education reforms? And what might
friendship do to make space for the thriving of capacities for joy, charity, and genuine relational connection?
vii
“My friends, if you want to have friends, do not have too many.” (Derrida, 2005, p. 22)
viii
An imperfect example, to be sure, but the point is that it’s one thing to see Joe Biden or Nancy Pelosi or other
democrats vilify Trump; it’s another entirely to see members of his own party do so.
ix
All names in this second story are pseudonyms.
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